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Abstract 
With the accession talks at a virtual halt, economic cooperation presents itself as one of the few 
open areas of dialogue between the EU and Turkey. On the one hand, Turkey is trying to reposition 
itself as a regional and global player weighing its options outside of the EU in terms of economic 
cooperation. On the other hand, both parties agree to the need to upgrade the current limited 
Customs Union (CU) agreement. Outside of but highly relevant for the political tensions between 
the two long term partners, the world trading regime is on the verge of major changes through 
mega trade agreements such as the TPP and the TTIP. Although currently rising trade wars seem 
to shadow the multilateral trade regime, big deals are to come whether bilateral or otherwise. 
More than the EU, Turkey will need to shape its policy to prevent potential losses. This paper 
evaluates different modes of economic cooperation between the EU and Turkey as well as 
TuƌkeǇ͛s poteŶtial iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ paƌtŶeƌships outside of the EU. 
 
Özet 
Üyelik müzakereleri duƌŵa aşaŵasıŶa gelŵişkeŶ, AB ǀe TüƌkiǇe aƌasıŶda iletişiŵ iŵkâŶı kalaŶ 
Ŷadiƌ alaŶlaƌdaŶ ďiƌi ekoŶoŵik iş ďiƌliği çeƌçeǀesi olaƌak oƌtaǇa çıkŵaktadıƌ. Biƌ taƌaftaŶ, keŶdiŶi 
bölgesel ve küresel bir oyuncu olarak yenideŶ koŶuŵlaŵa gaǇƌetiŶde olaŶ ǀe ďu doğƌultuda AB 
dışı alteƌŶatifleƌi değeƌleŶdiƌeŶ ďiƌ TüƌkiǇe ďuluŶŵaktadıƌ. Öte ǇaŶdaŶ heŵ AB heŵ de TüƌkiǇe 
işleǇişiŶde ďiƌçok soƌuŶu ďeƌaďeƌiŶde getiƌeŶ ǀe kapsaŵ olaƌak liŵitli Güŵƌük Biƌliği aŶlaşŵasıŶıŶ 
güncellenmesi koŶusuŶda ŵutaďık ďuluŶŵaktadıƌ. Küƌesel tiĐaƌet ƌejiŵi, İki ülkeŶiŶ aƌasıŶdaki 
siǇasi geƌiliŵleƌiŶ dışıŶda aŵa aǇŶı zaŵaŶda ďu geƌiliŵleƌi çok ǇakıŶda ilgileŶdiƌeĐek ďüǇük ďiƌ 
değişiğiŵiŶ eşiğiŶdediƌ. TƌaŶs-Atlantik ve trans-pasifik tiĐaƌet aŶlaşŵalaƌı ďu değişiŵiŶ 
gösteƌgeleƌi ŶiteliğiŶdediƌ. Her ne kadaƌ şu aŶda tiĐaƌet saǀaşlaƌıŶıŶ güŶdeŵde olŵası çok taƌaflı 
tiĐaƌet ƌejiŵiŶi gölgeliǇoƌ olsa da, öŶüŵüzdeki döŶeŵ ikili ǀeǇa faƌklı şekilleƌde ďüǇük tiĐaƌet 
aŶlaşŵalaƌıŶıŶ ǇapılaĐağı öŶgöƌülŵektediƌ. Bu değişiŵiŶ aƌifesiŶde özellikle TüƌkiǇe͛ŶiŶ doğƌu 
politikalaƌı ďeŶiŵseǇeƌek, değişiŵiŶ oluŵsuz etkileƌiŶe kaƌşı keŶdisiŶi koƌuŵaǇa alŵası geƌekliliği 
göƌülŵektediƌ. Bu ŵakale, AB ǀe TüƌkiǇe aƌasıŶda geƌçekleşeďileĐek faƌklı ekoŶoŵik iş ďiƌliği 
modellerini ve aǇŶı zaŵaŶda TüƌkiǇe͛ŶiŶ AB dışıŶdaki potaŶsiǇel iş ďiƌliği ihtiŵalleƌiŶi ŵeƌĐek 
altıŶa alŵaktadıƌ. 
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Introduction 
Economic cooperation between Turkey and European Union (EU) countries goes back a long time 
and is strongly underpinned by geographical proximity. Whilst economic cooperation is an 
inescapable reality, moving forward, its rules will have to be renegotiated between the parties to 
take aboard ever-changing realities.  
From a purely economic perspective, it is clear that Turkey has achieved significant gains from 
cooperation and integration with the EU. The so-Đalled EuƌopeaŶ ͞CoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe MaĐhiŶe͟ helped 
the Turkish economy transform in the past (Gill & Raiser, 2012; Gros, 2017). Following the start of 
economic liberalization in the ϭϵϴϬ͛s, TuƌkeǇ tƌulǇ ŵaŶaged to diǀeƌsifǇ its eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd iŶtegƌate 
with the World economy. Indeed, integration with the EU and the Customs Union (CU) agreement 
ǁas aŶ iŶtegƌal paƌt of TuƌkeǇ͛s tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ. This process was challenging in the beginning 
because of the sudden exposure of Turkish firms to global competition. But the private sector as 
a whole emerged stronger. Although the Customs Union agreement contains several 
imperfections and hence remains sub-optimal, its benefits to the economy are ubiquitous.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 which was followed by a sovereign debt crisis within the 
Eurozone unavoidably caused the EU to lose its lure as an economic powerhouse. However, as the 
EU growth is recovering, TuƌkeǇ still staŶds to ďeŶefit fƌoŵ ďeiŶg paƌt of the ͞ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe 
ŵaĐhiŶe͟. 
Yet, the relationship between Turkey and the EU has never been a simple one. As two neighboring 
partners, decisions that govern economic cooperation are seldom void of historical and cultural 
baggage. On the one hand, the membership talks that were initiated in October 2005 are at a 
virtual halt. With membership prospects out of the way, economic cooperation models remain 
the only mode of partnership.  
On the other hand, Turkey has been weighing its options regarding reaping the benefits of its 
wider region. As a member of WTO there are opportunities for Turkey to diversify its economic 
ties. Its more assertive role in regional and global affairs is a testimony to this perspective. At the 
same time, the country managed to diversify its exporting destinations in the past decade. The 
extent to which new export destinations help Turkey become producer of high value-added goods 
is debatable. The EU countries continue to be the main export destination of Turkey for mid and 
high technology goods. Finally, in the long-term Turkey will have to assess its position vis-à-vis the 
changing global trade regime. It may choose to be on the EU side of the table when negotiating 
with trading giants such as the US and China (Gros, 2017). The current terms of the Customs Union 
agreement prevent Turkey from being part of EU negotiations with third countries. 
The debate on the model of economic cooperation between the EU and Turkey is not a new one. 
In the ǁake of failiŶg ŵeŵďeƌship talks, the ĐoŶĐept of ͞pƌiǀileged paƌtŶeƌship͟ ƌesuƌfaĐed. The 
term, which has been highly contested in Turkey for a long time, is vague in itself but implies a 
level of economic integration that is less than membership and more than cooperation. The 
difference now is that both parties appear ready to discuss alternatives. The idea of a two-tier EU 
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and the UŶited KiŶgdoŵ͛s eǆit fƌoŵ the EU ;Brexit) provides thought for new kind of economic 
cooperation models between Turkey and the EU that will very likely also be the backbone of the 
relationship between the two ;Deƌǀiş, ϮϬϭϯͿ. 
At this critical juncture, this paper aims to examine the more commonly discussed economic 
cooperation models. Accordingly, chapter 1 takes stock of the Customs Union and its prospects, 
chapter 2 looks at different models of economic integration between the EU and Turkey and finally 
chapter 3 eǆaŵiŶes TuƌkeǇ͛s links with the Shanghai cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an 
alternative regional economic cooperation model which includes two key global economies; 
Russia and China. 
Chapter 1: Current Customs Union and Its Prospects  
Despite all the political turmoil of the last decade the European Union remains the most important 
trading partner of Turkey. This is true not only in terms of volume but also type of exchanges. EU 
member states continue to be the main destination for Turkish mid and high technology exports. 
Therefore, while the geographical diversification of Turkish exports over the last two decades is a 
noticeable development, trade with the EU is fundamental to achieve the couŶtƌǇ͛s deǀelopŵeŶt 
targets. 
The EU-Turkey bilateral preferential trade framework is a complex one which goes beyond the 
Customs Union as summarized in the table below, taken from the Impact Assessment Inception 
Report of the European Commission. 
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Table 1: EU-Turkey Preferential Trade Framework 
Association 
 
1963 Association Agreement 
(Ankara Agreement) 
 
Establishes association between the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, with 
the aim to continuously strengthen trade and 
economic relations, in particular through the 
progressive establishment of a Customs Union 
in three stages: preparatory, transitional and 
final, with protocols laying down the rules of 
the preparatory stage. 
 
1970 Additional Protocol  
 
Lays down the rules for implementing the 
transitional stage of creating the Customs 
Union, including the progressive abolition of 
customs duties between the EEC and Turkey 
over twenty-two years. 
 
Current bilateral 
preferential trade 
framework (BPTF) 
including CU for industrial 
goods 
 
1995 Customs Union Decision  
 
Establishes the Customs Union for industrial 
goods by the final stage which ensures that 
Turkey aligns its external tariffs to those of the 
EU. Also requires that Turkey aligns its 
customs and technical legislation to the EU as 
well as its commercial policy vis-à-vis third 
countries in the CU context. 
 
1996 Coal and Steel Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA)  
 
FTA on coal and steel products (including rules 
on competition).  
 
1998 Agriculture and Fisheries 
͚FTA͛  
 
Bilateral preferential concessions in 
agricultural and fisheries products. 
 
Accession process 
 
1999 Turkey candidate for EU 
accession 
 
Turkey takes political commitment to 
progressively harmonise its national 
legislation with the EU acquis. 
 
2005 start of accession 
negotiations 
 
Up to now, 16 out of the total 35 chapters 
have been opened 
 
 
As demonstrated, the scope of the relationship between the two partners goes well beyond that 
of the Customs Union dating back to the 1963 Association Agreement. Since coming into force at 
the very end of 1995, Turkey has benefited greatly from the CU agreement. It covers trade in 
industrial goods (including the industrial components of processed agricultural products) and 
excludes primary agriculture and services. As a result of the CU, trade integration between the 
two parties is significant as there has been almost a fourfold increase in bilateral trade since 1996. 
According to European Union statistics for 2017 Turkey is the EU͛s ϱth ŵaiŶ tƌadiŶg paƌtŶeƌ 
globally with the value of bilateral trade in goods curreŶtlǇ aŵouŶtiŶg to €ϭϱϰ billion. The EU is 
the most important trading partner for Turkey, representing 41% of Turkey`s global trade. The CU 
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has brought greater benefits than a free trade agreement (FTA) would have. The World Bank 
(2014Ϳ estiŵated that TuƌkeǇ͛s eǆpoƌts to the EU ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ ϯ.Ϭ%-7.2% lower under an FTA. 
AŶotheƌ ƋuaŶtitatiǀe assessŵeŶt ďǇ AǇtuğ et al ;ϮϬϭϳͿ estiŵates that as a ƌesult of the CU, 
TuƌkeǇ͛s eǆpoƌts to the EU haǀe iŶĐƌeased ďǇ ϯϴ% aŶd Tuƌkish GDP peƌ Đapita ďǇ ϭϯ%. 
 
It would be safe to say that the CU has led the ǁaǇ to TuƌkeǇ͛s integration into the world trade 
system. Competitive pressures acted as the driver of transformation of the Turkish manufacturing 
industry as a whole resulting in Turkish firms to be integrated into global value chains. The 
availability of high quality intermediary goods contributed to the increase in export sophistication. 
In addition to the productivity gains for firms, the CU agreement has also led the way for increased 
FDI into the country. Over the years, European FDI into Turkey have increased significantly, with 
three quarters of overall FDI stocks coming from the EU (66,3% on average between 2008 and 
ϮϬϭϲͿ, TuƌkeǇ has ďeĐoŵe iŶtegƌated iŶto the EU͛s supplǇ aŶd pƌoduĐtioŶ ĐhaiŶs ;Vesterbye & 
Akman, 2017: 2). The European FDI has been the main source of innovation and R&D investment 
in Turkey for the last two decades ;AtiǇas & Bakış, ϮϬϭϱͿ. Finally, the CU further acted as a driver 
for regulatory modernization.  
 
The economic rationale for this discussion is 
quite straight forward. The 2014 World Bank 
studǇ titled ͞EǀaluatioŶ of the EU-Turkey 
Custoŵs UŶioŶ͟ as ǁell as the iŵpaĐt 
assessment undertaken by the Commission 
clearly concludes that a deepening of the CU 
agreement would benefit both sides (The 
World Bank, 2014) as global economy 
changes raising new challenges for both 
parties. However, there is also a political 
rationale. The political developments both in 
the EU and in Turkey have resulted in 
virtually pausing of the accession process. 
For the time being, the CU (or any other trade deal) appears to be the only medium that would 
enable the two sides to entertain dynamic relations despite the currently damaged relationship.  
 
In the last 20 years, the CU agreement has been a significant positive contributor to Turkey and 
the EU relationship both economically and politically. Likewise, going forward, both parties stand 
to benefit from its modernization. Currently, the modernization of the CU is blocked by some EU 
member states and institutions for political reasons. Yet instead of politicizing this process keeping 
it technical in nature would benefit the relationship. 
0%
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Share of TK Exports to the EU in Total TK Exports
Share of TK Imports from the the EU in Total TK Imports
Share of Trade with the EU in Total TK Trade
Figure 1: Share of Trade (exports & imports) with the 
EU in Total Turkish Foreign Trade 
Source: TUİK (Turkish Statistical Office) 
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Chapter 1.1: Modernisation of the Customs Union 
The dialogue on the modernization of the CU started in 2014 and in December 2016 the European 
Commission completed its working document recommending authorization of the opening of 
negotiations with Turkey. In his statement on December 8, 2017, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet 
Şiŵşek ƌeiteƌated TuƌkeǇ͛s eǆpeĐtatioŶs foƌ the CU modernization (Hurriyet Daily News, 2017). 
The Council has not yet given mandate to begin negotiations. The modernization of the Customs 
Union agreement entails the extension of the agreement to include agriculture and services as 
well as changes in dispute settlement, public procurement, state aid, and services regulation.  
There are a number of reasons that drive the discussion behind CU modernization. From the 
political perspective, it would help the EU regain its position as a benchmark for Turkey. For 
Turkey, modernization of the CU and its proper enforcement would actually prepare it for the 
mega-trade agreements such as TTIP. On the economy side, removing more tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade in various sectors would benefit both sides. On the Turkish side in particular, it 
has the potential to provide next wave of productivity growth that the country needs through 
increased trade, investment and regulatory upgrade. Finally, on the technical front, this would 
provide an opportunity to resolve all the issues that EU criticizes Turkey regarding poor 
implementation of its commitments (European Commission, 2016). 
Turkey would particularly benefit from liberalizing its trade with the EU with regards to services 
(particularly professional services) not only in terms of trade but also productivity (The World 
Bank, 2014). According to a study by the European Commission (EC, 2016), an enhanced 
commercial framework could ƌaise ǁelfaƌe iŶ the EU aŶd TuƌkeǇ ďǇ €ϱ ďillioŶ aŶd €12 billion 
respectively. Potential welfare gains including agriculture and services in the CU is estimated at 
ϭ.ϴϰ% additioŶal gaiŶ to TuƌkeǇ͛s GDP (Felbermayr, et al., 2016).  
On the public procurement side, the opening up of Turkish tenders to EU companies would restore 
competition in public procurement. The increased competition would benefit increase the 
efficiency of the allocation of public resources. It would be beneficial for the Turkish firms by 
alloǁiŶg theŵ to ďid iŶ EU ĐouŶtƌies͛ puďliĐ teŶdeƌs oŶ a leǀel plaǇiŶg field ǁith otheƌ plaǇeƌs. 
There are a quite number of Turkish firms that are globally successful which operate in sectors 
such as construction and transportation which enjoy a large share of public tenders in the EU.  
After considering various options for the future of EU-TuƌkeǇ tƌade ƌelatioŶs ;e.g. ͚Ŷo poliĐǇ 
ĐhaŶge͛, ͚ CU ŵodeƌŶizatioŶ aŶd FTA iŶ additioŶal aƌeas͛ aŶd ͚ Deep aŶd CoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe Fƌee Tƌade 
AgreemeŶt͛Ϳ, the EC “tudǇ of ϮϬϭϲ ĐoŶĐludes that the ďest poliĐǇ optioŶ was that of a Modernized 
Customs Union plus an FTA covering services, public procurement and further liberalization in 
agriculture (European Commission, 2016). In the no policy change scenario, it is deemed likely that 
trade between the two partners would be harmed due to poor implementation standards on the 
Turkish side and the non-functioning dispute resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, the unfulfilled 
potential that would come from further liberalization of trade would remain unrealized with 
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Turkey losing its competitiveness. The second option, namely the CU modernization and FTA in 
additional areas, projects GDP growth for both parties, albeit larger for the EU, and provides an 
opportunity to fix the design deficiencies of the CU. The third option of a DCFTA is assessed to be 
economically less beneficial. But more importantly, it falls short of solving some of the problems 
faced today. First, it removes the legal obligation of Turkey to align itself with EU policy and leaves 
it to its commitment and second, Turkey continues to go at it alone when negotiating trade 
agreements with third parties. Two reasons why it would not be suitable for both parties. 
The next chapter looks into different models of cooperation that could strengthen EU-Turkey 
economic integration.  
Chapter 2: Different Models of Economic Integration  
Chapter 2.1: European Economic Area Membership  
The European Economic Area (EEA) Membership of Turkey is often discussed as an alternative to 
EU membership and model to govern the economic cooperation between the EU and Turkey. The 
rationale for this option is twofold. First, it may act as a waiting room for Turkey on its way to 
becoming a full EU Member State (Pelkmans, et al., 2012). This is not unprecedented: Austria, 
Sweden and Finland were members to the EEA before acceding the EU. Second, the EEA would 
provide relevant mechanisms of a sort of sub-membership if this would turn out to be the only 
solution for EU-Turkey. This has already been applied in the case of Norway – a country that has 
strictly ruled out an EU membership. Moreover, in the latter outcome, Turkey and the EU would 
have a much deeper economic integration than what the CU is currently offering. An EEA would 
even go beyond a modernized version of the CU because it effectively means single market except 
for Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies. In fact, it would even bring about a deeper 
integration than between EFTA countries that are also in the EEA but not part of the Customs 
Union. It is important to note that EEA membership would be equivalent of closing 21 chapters of 
the EU͛s aĐƋuis ĐoŵŵuŶautaiƌe that are closely linked to the internal market. However difficult 
this may sound the option of EEA membership is a compelling one and also realistic particularly as 
hopes for EU membership wane. Nonetheless, this option is deemed practically and legally 
difficult. First, it would undermine the functioning of the EEA as mentioned below. Second, it 
would be unrealistic to expect Turkey to align with all the policy implied by being in the EEA prior 
to stronger political decision and commitment for the future of the relationship between Turkey 
and the EU.  
The primary objective of the EEA agreement was to increase the level of economic integration 
between EU and EFTA countries through the extension of the Internal Market to these countries. 
The non-EU EEA countries do not have any decision power over issues concerning the Internal 
Market. However, they are obliged to implement relevant EU acquis on a rolling basis. The fact 
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that the EEA is properly functioning is demonstration of the consensus by all members on the 
benefits of the Internal Market and also the administrative capacity of its non-EU members. 
Ironically, even if EEA membership was an option desired by both the EU and Turkey, there would 
be little both could legally do. Simply because the membership is not for the EU to offer. Prior to 
becoming a non-EU EEA member, Turkey would first have to become an EFTA member getting the 
approval of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. There is very little evidence to willingness of these 
countries to invite Turkey into their club. The rationale for both the EFTA and the EEA is the same: 
As mentioned above, these institutions rely on a consensus of mutual benefit and adequate acquis 
transposition capacity. There is little room for politics if at all for their well-functioning. Therefore, 
the introduction of Turkey would potentially undermine the smooth functioning. Yet, for too long 
now Turkey has been, rightfully so, complaining about the asymmetry created by the Customs 
Union agreement ǁith ƌegaƌds to EU͛s Fƌee Tƌade AgƌeeŵeŶts ǁith thiƌd ĐouŶtƌies. IŶ the Đase of 
EEA membership, Turkey would have to accept adopting a significant amount of legislation for 
which it has no say during deliberations. This seems unlikely. In short, a country like Turkey would 
undermine the functioning of the EEA and thus its introduction through EFTA would not be 
welcome. 
It is worth revisiting the fact that, EEA membership would mean Turkey͛s alignment with the 
acquis across 21 chapters that concern the Internal Market. This would mean a massive reform 
initiative by Turkey. Whether Turkey currently has the right kind of domestic political environment 
to undertake these reforms is a valid question. But more importantly, even if so, it is highly 
questionable whether Turkey would be willing to undertake all these efforts without a proper end 
in sight. As mentioned before, the EEA could either be a road leading to EU membership that 
would allow for partially delaying political priorities initially and focusing on the Internal Market. 
Yet, if this was the case, Turkey would needed to be presented with this scenario. Alternatively, 
the EEA could be a desired halfway solution that is short of EU membership but going well beyond 
the Customs Union. Officially, Turkey accepts nothing short of EU membership proper. It is 
unknown if Turkey would officially opt for a membership minus solution. When comparing the 
EEA option with the Customs Union modernization, it is important to note that while the latter 
presents with a scenario to keep the relationship going, improve it to be more beneficial, at the 
same time it keeps the full membership option on the table. 
Chapter 2.2: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement  
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) represent a series of arrangements 
between the EU on the one hand and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other, which ensure 
preferential trade regimes; better access to markets; similarity of regulatory environment among 
others. In essence, the DCFTA is only a part of the more comprehensive Association Agreements 
(AA) between the EU and these three post-soviet countries respectively, which covers trade and 
trade-related matters of the AA. The AA treaty, besides trade affairs, envisages cooperation on 
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issues such as political dialogue and reform; in the areas of foreign and security policy; freedom, 
security and justice; economic and sectoral policies and others. 
The Agreement with Georgia and Moldova was signed in June 2014, and has subsequently been 
ratified by the European Parliament, all 28 EU member states as well as by Georgia and Moldova. 
For these countries, the AA had entered provisionally into force since September 2014 to a great 
extent already, while the AA completely entered into force in July 2016 only.1 Unlike Georgia and 
Moldova, Ukraine faced some obstacles and delays in signing the Agreement due to pressure from 
Russia. The AA between the Ukraine and the EU was signed in June 2014 and provisionally entered 
into force in November 2014, except the DCFTA2, which took effect only provisionally, in January 
2016. However, the Agreement with Ukraine is lacking ratification by one EU member states – the 
Netherlands – due to the negative turnout of a referendum3. Therefor the AA has not completely 
entered into force yet. Additionally, it should be mentioned that even before the provisional entry 
of the DCFTA, the EU unilaterally liberalized trade with Ukraine from April 2014 through the 
͚autoŶoŵous tƌade ŵeasuƌes͛, aŶd ǁith Moldoǀa fƌoŵ ϮϬϬϴ through 'autonomous trade 
preferences'. 
In general, the DCFTA arrangement contains two broad components: the agreement on free trade 
– the FTA part – which abolishes tariff barriers thus providing better access to markets, and 
envisages other trade remedies; and the Deep and Comprehensive (DC) part, which focuses on 
harmonization of legal and regulatory environment in partner countries with EU standards, 
including competition policy and intellectual property rights, technical standards and food safety 
regulations, public procurement and services liberalization  (ISET Policy Institute, 2016). The 
puƌpose of the ͚DC͛ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt is to Đƌeate iŶ paƌtŶeƌ ĐouŶtƌies, a ďusiŶess eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt siŵilaƌ 
to that in the EU and thus to facilitate for European companies the entry to respective markets.  
The establishing of a free trade area aims first of all at abolishing the most import duties and 
prohibition of all export duties as well as all quantitative restrictions (unless allowed by relevant 
WTO rule). For instance, the EU͛s DCFTA with Ukraine targets elimination of 98.1% and 99.1% 
peƌĐeŶt of duties iŶ EU͛s aŶd UkƌaiŶe͛s tƌade ǀoluŵes, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ (European Commission, 2013). 
In particular, with regard to industrial goods, exported from Ukraine, EU removes immediately 
94,7% of tariff lines, while remaining ones will be abolished after a certain transitional period 
(Emerson & Movchan, 2016; European Commission, 2014). Ukraine, in turn, grants immediate 
preferential treatments to 49.2% of industrial exports from the EU. For selected industrial 
products Ukraine opens its markets only after a transition period of three up to seven years (with 
the car industry receiving special safeguard treatment). Upon a transitional period, 96% of EU 
                                                          
1Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/georgia/  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/moldova/ 
2 Source: Due to request from Russia 
3  Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/ 
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industrial exports to Ukraine will be liberalized. For agricultural products, the EU fully abolishes 
82.2% of tariff lines immediately, while 1.2% will be removed after a seven-year transitional period 
(Emerson & Movchan, 2016; European Commission, 2014). For some types of agricultural 
products, the EU applies tariff-rate quotas (TRQ). However, as recent analysis of the DCFTA 
implementation shows, the TRQs are not binding and most of them are not utilized completely or 
are employed only partially (Emerson & Movchan, 2016). Among the factors that limit the use of 
TRQ are: non-compliance with EU food safety and SPS standards, problems on the side of both 
demand and supply; problems in distribution channels (Movchan et al., 2015). Ukraine, in turn, 
fully removes 88.5% of duties on agricultural products, half of which will be eliminated 
immediately and the other half after a transitional period of up to seven years. It should be 
mentioned that not all tariffs for EU exports will be reduced to zero. Additionally, like the EU, 
Ukraine applies TRQ on some products, though their number are much smaller than those of the 
EU͛s (Emerson & Movchan, 2016). In general, according to European Commission estimations, 
under the DCFTA arrangement, annually, Ukraine will lose approximately 391 millions of Euro in 
import duties, while Ukrainian exporters will save 487 millions of Euro from tariff liberalization 
(European Commission, 2013; Emerson & Movchan, 2016).  
Like in the previous example, in case of Moldova tariff liberalization is asymmetrical, too. For 
instance, the EU fully and immediately removes all tariffs duties on industrial goods, while 
Moldova enjoys a transition period of three to five years for several goods (Gill & Raiser, 2012; Gill 
& Raiser, 2012). For agricultural products, however, full liberalization is not assumed. Though the 
duties on most of Moldavian agricultural export will be liberalized immediately, TRQ still applies 
to a limited number of agricultural products ;EŵeƌsoŶ & CeŶuşa, ϮϬϭϲͿ. The asymmetry in trade 
liberalization assumed by DCFTA arrangements with Ukraine and Moldova, gives time to domestic 
producers in these countries to prepare for competition with EU companies and thus supports 
these countries in safeguarding of sensitive industries. Not like Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, 
doesŶ͛t eŶjoǇ a tƌaŶsitioŶ peƌiod foƌ the eliŵiŶatioŶ of iŵpoƌt taƌiffs, ďeĐause suĐh taƌiffs ǁeƌe 
abolished earlier under a liberal reform (Emerson & Kovziridze, 2016). DCFTA with Georgia 
assumes full liberalization of trade in goods with only limited number of exceptions for some 
agricultural goods. For instance, on some sensitive agricultural products EU applies tariff rate 
quotas (TRQ). Another exception is foreseeing of ͚aŶti-ĐiƌĐuŵǀeŶtioŶ ŵeĐhaŶisŵ͛, ǁhiĐh assuŵes 
monitoring of trade flows and productive capacities of the respective country with the aim to 
safeguard against fraudulent supply from third countries. Also, several products are subject to a 
specific duty (Emerson & Kovziridze, 2016). 
The DCFTA foresees the general rules of origin, which confirm whether a good is eligible for 
ƌeĐeiǀiŶg a ŵoǀeŵeŶt ĐeƌtifiĐate of oƌigiŶ ͚EU‘.ϭ͛, ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ eǆpoƌtiŶg to the EU. In particular, 
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the Protocol I of the Association Agreement4 outlines different criteria, which confirm whether a 
good is wholly obtained from the territory of one of the parties, or whether products have 
uŶdeƌgoŶe ͞suffiĐieŶt pƌoĐessiŶg͟ to oďtaiŶ the ŵoǀeŵeŶt ĐeƌtifiĐate. “ince the DCFTA allows 
bilateral accumulation5 all partner countries can benefit in mid and long term by applying diagonal 
accumulation 6aŵoŶg its ŵeŵďeƌs. Geoƌgia, ĐaŶ also gaiŶ fƌoŵ ͚diagoŶal acĐuŵulatioŶ͛ of ƌules 
of origin with Turkey, after aligning bilateral free trade agreement between these two countries 
ǁith the EU͛s sǇsteŵ of ƌules of oƌigiŶ (Emerson & Kovziridze, 2016). Other important aspects of 
the DCFTA are rules that define trade remedies against imports that can potentially jeopardize 
domestic economy, such as provisions for anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard, based on the 
relevant WTO rules. 
The key policy instruments of this component of the trade arrangement are: 1) measures that 
ensure fast, efficient and transparent customs services; 2) activities oriented on the adoption of 
European technical regulations, procedures and standards for industrial products, which are vital 
for overcoming technical barriers for trade and ensuring modernization and competitiveness; 3) 
strategies focused on approximation of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and 
legislation in agri-food sectors with that of EU, and introduction of EU-style institutional and legal 
framework for SPS measures; 4) commitments to liberalization and reservations of services, which 
are necessary for the development of a dynamic and competitive service sector; 5) activities that 
ensure aligning of public procurement system and legislation with EU requirements, which 
increase transparency and competition; 6) efforts aimed to modernize intellectual property rights 
system; 7) legal commitments that comply with DCFTA requirements for competition policy; 8) 
measures oriented on creation modern and internationally comparable statistical system. 
In the context of Turkey-EU relations, the DCTFA arrangements with post-soviet countries can be 
considered as an outline for the future development of the trade and economic relationships 
between Turkey and EU. Though, generally, having positive impact on the Turkish economy, the 
existing Custom Union agreement causes some problems in Turkey-EU relations, due to its 
                                                          
4 See: Protocol I Concerning the Definition of the Concept of "Originating Products" and Methods of 
Administrative Co-operation, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ukraine/pdf/12_ua_protocol_i_en.pdf 
5 Bilateral accumulation involves two partners and allows a trader in country A to use materials originating in 
country B as if they originated in A, and vice versa, with the origin criteria applying only to non-originating goods; 
it is therefore sufficient for the operation carried out in A to have been "more than minimal" to obtain A origin 
for the goods; this form of accumulation is applied in all the bilateral agreements concluded by the Community 
and in its autonomous preferential arrangements (Generalised preference schemes, separate measures for the 
Western Balkans, Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) procedure). 
6 Diagonal accumulation is based on the same principle but involves at least three partners who must have 
established a network of free trade agreements among themselves incorporating the same rules of origin and 
providing for this type of accumulation; the prototype of this form of accumulation is "pan-European" 
accumulation, involving the Community, the EFTA countries, the countries of central and eastern Europe and 
Turkey. 
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asymmetric nature (Mumcu & Balin, 2016). For instance, those countries who have established 
FTAs with the EU can export goods to Turkey without any duty, while maintaining import tariffs 
on Turkish goods. Thus, signing an FTA agreement with EU instead of a Customs Union would help 
in solving existing issues in Turkey-EU relations and in general will be much more beneficial for 
Turkey than existing trade regime. Along with increased exports of goods, such an agreement will 
attract FDI to Turkey from countries that do not enjoy free access to EU markets (e.g. China. Russia 
and etc.). 
Chapter 2.3: Market access through Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, also known as TTIP, is fundamentally an 
agreement designed to allow the United States of America (US) and EU companies to easily offer 
their services and products in the EU member states and in the US respectively. The idea was born 
out of necessity. First, in the aftermath of the failure of the 14 years long Doha talks in 2015, 
countries started looking for alternatives to the multi-lateral trading regime of the WTO. The most 
noteworthy one was the Trans-Pacific Partnership that involves the US, Japan and Vietnam along 
with nine other countries. Second, governments searched for a way out of stagnation at the time 
following the global financial crises. Accordingly, in June 2013 the negotiations for the TTIP 
agreement were initiated. 
A lot has changed in the world since the initiation of these negotiations. The election of Donald 
Trump as the US President in 2016 caused a rupture as President Trump stood by his protectionist 
election platform and halted the TTIP negotiations.  
 
While the European Commission iterated that the impasse did not necessarily mean that the 
negotiations were officially off, politics on the EU side have not been a rosy ride either. From the 
onset, the TTIP faced massive public protests particularly from the left-wing supporters within the 
EU. The argument behind the protests were that the TTIP would mean the EU lowering its 
environmental standards to the level of the US and that sovereignty would be transferred to 
multinational corporations due the envisaged dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The environmental concerns have been somewhat justified. In mid 2017, the US administration 
initiated a softening on its position with respect to the TTIP (The Financial Times, 2017). However, 
as President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement on climate 
change mitigation, things again took a turn for the worse. In late January 2018, French Foreign 
Minister Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne deĐlaƌed FƌaŶĐe͛s positioŶ on not reviving the TTIP talks unless 
Trump foregoes his promise to pull the US from the Paris Agreement (Keating, 2018). Needless to 
say, the EU͛s ƌespoŶse to PƌesideŶt͛s Trump plan imposing tariffs on steel and aluminium imports 
has been harsh (Reuters, 2018). 
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In sum, TTIP is off the table for the time being. Why then discussing it further? Whether be it TTIP 
or another such agreement, large trading blocks in the world will have to come to an agreement 
in the future. With the WTO multi-lateral trading regime beginning to lose its significance, the EU 
will find itself negotiating possibly another TTIP (or continue the current negotiations) (Gros, 
2017). This is where Turkey comes in. The fact that Turkey is a by-stander to the trade agreements 
that the EU signs with third countries already constitutes a big tension point between Turkey and 
the EU. Understandably, a trade deal with a partner the size of the US worries the Turkish 
authorities more than other relatively smaller countries. This is the case for two reasons. First, the 
sheer size of the US economy and the second is the ability of Turkey to undertake a FTA with the 
US. The TTIP is also ƌeleǀaŶt foƌ TuƌkeǇ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoopeƌatioŶ ŵodel ǁith the EU fƌoŵ the 
perspective of deepening the CU. As TTIP covers areas such as agriculture and public procurement 
that are currently outside the scope of the Customs Union but would be a part of after a 
modernization and deepening. Indeed, if this was to be achieved before the signing of the TTIP, 
Turkey would be in a much-prepared state to ͞doĐk iŶ͟ to the agƌeeŵeŶt, ǁhiĐh is the ŵost 
ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ǀoiĐed ŵeĐhaŶisŵ of TuƌkeǇ͛s iŶĐlusioŶ. 
The initial impact of the TTIP agreement will be Turkish exports facing more competition in the EU 
market as US imports will be benefiting from reduced tariffs as well as removed non-tariff barriers. 
In addition, US products will access the Turkish markets without any duty while the reciprocal is 
not possible due to lack of a FTA between Turkey and the US. Finally, Turkish exports to the US 
will have a disadvantage with regards to European exports due to the latter not facing any duty. 
A study  estimates that non-inclusion of Turkey in the TTIP could result in GDP loss of 0.1 to 0.5% 
for Turkey ;Maǀuş, et al., 2013). On the other hand, its inclusion could yield additional GDP growth 
between 0.6 to 4%. The same study estimates the gains for both the EU and the US up to 0.3% 
increased GDP growth in both inclusion and exclusion scenarios. This is important. The inclusion 
of Turkey in the TTIP not only has clear gains for Turkey but also benefits both the EU and the US. 
Indeed, what is not estimated in studies so far is the externalities that Turkey stands to benefit. 
These benefits come from the regulatory alignments that Turkey will have to undertake as a result 
as well as increased investment and FDI. 
The future of TTIP is unclear for the time being. Even if it goes through, the mechanism through 
which, if at all, Turkey would be involved are also unclear. Turkey, like other third countries that 
have Preferential Trading Areas (PTA)s either with the US or the EU, will probably be better off if 
they do not insist on being a part of the negotiations from the onset but rather try to develop side 
conversations with the relevant party with regard to their particular case and get ready to be 
included when the time comes (Ulgen, 2014). In the case of Turkey, the deepening of the Customs 
Union agreement provides a tool exactly for that. Turkey is at a point where it can benefit from 
the overlapping of the CU and the TTIP and revive its trade policy vis-à-vis the EU in the short term 
and also well position itself for the coming mega-trade agreements such as the TTIP (Long, 2016). 
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Chapter 3: Turkey’s Eurasian Option: The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation 
 
Chapter 3.1: Level of Integration between Turkey-SCO 
Geographical proximity does not only link Turkey with the European Union market, which 
constitutes the most developed single market in the world, but with neighboring Asian markets as 
well whose growth rates are accelerating. The reason why SCO is examined rather than other 
regional cooperation options is the political will that has been voiced by Turkish policy makers at 
the highest level to be a part of the organization. One of the largest and newest formations in 
Eurasia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was established in 2001 (though 
originally founded in 1996) by China, the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan. On 9 June 2017, India and Pakistan joined SCO as full-fledged members. SCO was 
initiated uŶdeƌ the Ŷaŵe ͞“haŶghai Fiǀe͟ to build mutual trust among its member states, to 
disarm the border regions and to encourage regional cooperation. The Organization does not have 
economic goals in the heart of its activities as its primary objectives are promoting cooperation 
on security-related issues, namely to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Thus, the first 
actions of the Shanghai Five were in 1996 and in ϭϵϵϳ ǁheŶ the ͞TƌeatǇ oŶ DeepeŶiŶg MilitaƌǇ 
Tƌust iŶ Boƌdeƌ ‘egioŶs͟ aŶd the ͞TƌeatǇ oŶ ‘eduĐtioŶ of MilitaƌǇ FoƌĐes iŶ Boƌdeƌ ‘egioŶs͟ were 
respectively signed. In summit meetings between 1998 and 2000 SCO members considered ways 
to increase security in border region as well as on political, economic and security issues. SCO did 
not originally aim at a close union of its member states. Rather than being conceived as a vehicle 
of advanced integration, it was formed as a confidence-building forum to demilitarize borders. It 
has been argued that the organization has emerged as an anti-U.S. bulwark in Central Asia, and it 
is also believed that frictions among its members effectively prohibit a unified, thus effective SCO 
(Albert, 2015). 
 
Throughout time, the organization's agenda has broadened to include military and 
counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing while it has turned its focus, even though 
reluctantly, towards economic cooperation. At a Heads of State Meeting held in Shanghai on 14-
15 June 2001 and in the light of global security developments it was decided to transform the 
Shanghai Five into a regional organization to carry out a more effective cooperation for combating 
threats of terrorism, separatism and radicalism. In this context, the Declaration on the 
Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ͞ “haŶghai CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ CoŵďatiŶg 
Teƌƌoƌisŵ, “epaƌatisŵ aŶd Eǆtƌeŵisŵ͟ ǁere signed. The SCO was also enlarged with Uzbekistan. 
Soon after, on 14 September 2001, a Memorandum of Understanding on Creating Better 
Conditions for Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade, as well as Investments was signed. In 
parallel to developing security oriented and anti-terrorism structures, the SCO took steps to 
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enhancing Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation. The integration of the two major 
economic schemes in Eurasia, the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt and the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union, has attracted the interest of SCO. A SCO Development Strategy was adopted at 
the Ufa Summit in Russia, which includes bolstering finance, investment, and trade cooperation 
as a priority over the next ten years. A SCO Development Bank and the establishment of a regional 
fƌee tƌade zoŶe has ďeeŶ also pƌoposed ďǇ BeijiŶg. Despite MosĐoǁ͛s skeptiĐisŵ oǀeƌ suĐh 
proposals that could underline ChiŶa͛s iŶflueŶĐe iŶ CeŶtƌal Asia, otheƌ “haŶghai ŵeŵďeƌs haǀe 
embraced more economic cooperation (Albert, 2015). It is also believed that Russia may be finally 
more willing to cooperate with China in order to gain from closer ties (Albert, 2015). Still, however 
not much has taken place either in the issue of the development bank or in trade related issues. 
A field of interest primarily for Russia and other Shanghai members is energy. At a SCO Summit in 
June 2006, President Vladimir Putin called for an "energy dialogue, integration of our national 
energy concepts, and the creation of an Energy Club" that would lead to a unified energy market 
for oil and gas exports while also promoting regional development through preferential energy 
agreements  (Albert, 2015). As in the field of economy, in energy too such plans have not moved 
forward due to diverging interests between energy consumers (China) and energy producers 
(Russia, Kazakhstan), as members "prefer to keep national control over their production, supply, 
and consumption mechanisms and agreements," according to Julie Boland, a former Federal 
Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution (Albert, 2015). 
 
Table 2: SCO Members and Turkey 
Country Area 
(km2) 
Population 
(millions)  
GDP per capital (PPP, 
constant prices, 2011 
international dollar 
units) 
GDP (% of 
global PPP) 
Russia 17,075,400 143.965 24,971.057 3.221 
China 9,640,011 1,382.710 14,277.334 17.688 
India 3,287,590 1,299.796 6,210.040 7.232 
Kazakhstan 2,724,900 17.927 23,336.624 0.375 
Kyrgyzstan 199,900 6.140 3,261.141 0.018 
Pakistan 881,912 193.560 4,724.718 0.819 
Tajikistan 143,100 8.655 2,788.060 0.022 
Uzbekistan 447,400 31.848 6,044.950 0.172 
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Turkey 783,562 79.815 23,168.742 1.657 
 
Sources: IMF Data (2016) 
 
What does SCO mean for Turkey in trade terms? Among the SCO members, China and Russia are 
the laƌgest eĐoŶoŵies aŶd TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵaiŶ tƌade paƌtŶeƌs. China is the top import country for 
Turkey ($25 billion) and Russia represents the third largest import country ($10.4 billion). 
Accordingly, ϭϯ% of TuƌkeǇ͛s total imports come from China and 5.6% from Russia while 3.1% 
come from India. However, Turkey has a large trade deficit with the SCO group as only 1.3% of its 
exports are directed to Russia and 1.6% to China.7 Oǀeƌall, ϲ.ϳ% of TuƌkeǇ͛s foƌeigŶ tƌade is ǁith 
China, 5.7% with Russia, and 1.8% with India (year 2017). The level of bilateral trade with these 
thƌee “CO ĐouŶtƌies is thus high ;iŶ total ϭϰ.Ϯ% of TuƌkeǇ͛s foreign trade is conducted with these 
three) though still the EU28 as a trade block represents 40.7% of TuƌkeǇ͛s foƌeigŶ tƌade.8 Trade 
with all others SCO members is limited. TuƌkeǇ͛s eǆpoƌts to KazakhstaŶ ĐoŶstitute just 0.52%. 
There is thus potential for further liberalization of trade with SCO countries but problems do exist 
as in the case of a long negotiated Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Pakistan. Given the 
rising importance of Chinese capital not only for Turkey but also for other European economies, 
Turkey would opt for different levels and flexible models of economic integration with it. Chinese 
FDI in Turkey in 2016 is however limited, valued at approximately $642 million9 or 1.26% of FDI. 
Economic interdependences are stronger with Russia driven by energy needs, private sector 
interests and market complementarities. Russia is the eight largest investor in Turkey with a share 
of 6.10% of FDI10 focusing mainly on energy while Russia is one of the largest destinations for 
Tuƌkish ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ĐoŵpaŶies. As TuƌkeǇ͛s bilateral economic links with Russia and China are 
stronger and deeper than its links to the SCO as a group, it is these bilateral developments that 
laƌgelǇ defiŶe AŶkaƌa͛s “CO poliĐǇ. Ankara still values access to developed EU markets where it 
can bargain its economic interests. Its policy towards SCO lies somewhere between its distancing 
with the West and its seek for crafting new relations with emerging powers in a globalized 
economy.  
 
Chapter 3.2: Turkey in SCO: Arguments for and against 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was quoted in November 2016 saying that Turkey did not need 
to join the European Union "at all costs" and could instead become part of the SCO. He had already 
made the same announcement about possible SCO membership during a November 2013 meeting 
                                                          
7 Source: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/tur/  
8 Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf  
9 Source: Geoƌge Maƌshall LeƌŶeƌ, ͞IŶ TuƌkeǇ, U“ Loss Is ChiŶa's GaiŶ,͟ The Diplomat, January 31, 2017. 
10 Source: http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx  
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with V. Putin. According to Erdoğan, joining SCO would considerably broaden Turkey's "room for 
maneuver" (Natasha, 2016). 
On 23 March 2011, Turkey applied for receiving the Status of Dialogue Partnership in the SCO 
which was approved by the Organization in June 2012. A Memorandum setting out cooperation 
modalities between Turkey as Dialogue Partner and the SCO was signed on 26 April 2013 in Almaty 
by the theŶ MiŶisteƌ of FoƌeigŶ Affaiƌs Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu aŶd the former Secretary General of the 
SCO Dmitry Mezentsev as according to Turkish leadership Turkey shared "the same destiny" as 
members of the bloc. 11  Dialogue Partnership envisages the improvement of cooperation 
between Turkey and SCO in various areas mainly in regional security, fight against terrorism, drug 
trafficking and preventing organized crime as well as economic and cultural fields. Furthermore, 
Turkey chaired the Energy Club of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017, becoming 
the first non-SCO country to hold its term presidency. 
Beyond being the first dialogue partner to chair a prominent SCO institution in the history of the 
Organization12  is it possiďle foƌ TuƌkeǇ to ďeĐoŵe a full ŵeŵďeƌ of the “CO? TuƌkeǇ͛s ďid foƌ full 
membership is in principle supported by the member states of the Organization and its two 
regional power patrons. However, full membership in SCO would conflict with TurkeǇ͛s NATO 
membership. The founding members of SCO have openly pointed this and have signaled Turkey 
to distance itself from the western military alliance to become more integrated in the SCO.13 Still, 
SCO is not a strategic and military alliance like NATO. Unlike the NATO, the SCO does not guarantee 
the collective security of a member state in their alliance pact like NATO does by its Articles 1 and 
5. Unlike the NATO the SCO does not have an integrated military-political structure and does not 
get engaged in regular political deliberations. While the main focus of NATO is with external 
thƌeats, the “CO is ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith iŶteƌŶal seĐuƌitǇ issues ǁithiŶ its ŵeŵďeƌs͛ teƌƌitoƌǇ.14 
Furthermore, the secretariat of SCO has not expressed any interest on immediate enlargement 
and mentioned that the Organization has its own schedule to follow on this issue.15 It should also 
be kept in mind that there are other states in a more prioritized observer status like Iran, Mongolia 
and Belarus, waiting in line for membership accession. Thus, Turkish membership, even though 
welcomed and supported by the power patrons of the organization would be more gradual than 
expected.  
                                                          
11 Dialogue partners are entitled to take part in ministerial-level and some other meetings of the SCO, but do not 
have voting rights. 
12Source: "Turkey to chair 2017 Energy Club of Shanghai Cooperation Organization." DailySabah. November 24, 
2016. ttps://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/11/23/turkey-to-chair-2017-energy-club-of-shanghai-
cooperation-organization.  
13Source: “putŶik. "ŞaŶghaǇ Beşlisi kuƌuĐulaƌıŶdaŶ İǀaşoǀ: TüƌkiǇe üǇe oluƌ aŵa..." Sputnik Türkiye - Son dakika 
haberleri ve analizler - radyo, foto, video, infografik. November 21, 2016. 
14Source: Marcel de Haas, ͞Time for the EU and NATO to engage with the Shanghai Cooperation OrganisatioŶ͟, 
Europe’s World Autumn 2008, (October 01, 2008): 45. 
15Source:  Sputnik. "SCO Sees Increased Interest From Numerous States, Secretary General Says." Sputnik 
International - Breaking News & Analysis - Radio, Photos, Videos, Infographics. November 23, 2016. 
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The pƌospeĐt of TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship in SCO would thus raise ƋuestioŶs ƌegaƌdiŶg the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s 
future identity as a NATO member and an EU candidate and could damage its credibility as a 
Western ally. Joining the SCO is an easy process as it does not require reforms and meeting high 
standards of economic and political criteria. Thus, in contrast to EU membership which is itself a 
deep transformation process, SCO membership does not require domestic reforms and it is an 
easy process to conclude bearing no political cost domestically. AŶkaƌa͛s geopolitiĐal iŶteƌests iŶ 
Central Asia and its interest in the ethnically close Turkic peoples of Central Asia, including those 
in Kazakhstan underliŶe its iŶteƌest iŶ “CO. AŶkaƌa͛s CeŶtƌal AsiaŶ poliĐǇ is ƌeǀieǁed as paƌt of the 
ǁideƌ ƌeĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of TuƌkeǇ͛s stƌategiĐ positioning in a multi-polar environment. The 
improvement in relations with Russia is part of this trend. Turkey is looking to gain greater 
leadership influence in Eurasia, and serve as a bridge between Europe, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (Ibragimova, 2016). Furthermore, the authoritarian regimes of all other SCO members are 
closer to the current Erdogan regime. The erosion of democratic institutions in Turkey actually 
facilitates closer cooperation with Central Asian regimes and would relax their concerns on a 
democratic pro-Western Turkey. 
The prospect of Turkey joining SCO is not however necessarily strongly welcome by all members 
of the organization as its bilateral relations with SCO members have not always been smooth (as 
with the case of Uzbekistan). Furthermore, Central Asia is only marginal in Turkish foreign policy 
compared to its bilateral relations with China and Russia, thus it is questionable whether Ankara 
would move beyond the current sectoral partnership status to deeper integration with its Asian 
neighbors. One of the political consideration that underpins TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌeluĐtaŶĐe is being part of a 
China-Russia dominated group where its influence will be limited.  
 
Chapter 3.3: Significance for EU – Turkey Relations 
Can the SCO constitute an alternative to the EU for Turkey? The SCO is not in equal standing to 
the EU as a political organization. The EU is a bonding political union that unifies its member states 
in an economic, political, and monetary union whereas the SCO is an alliance implying shallow 
integration. Therefore, the SCO should not be seen as an alternative or the Eurasian counterpart 
to the EU. This has been argued by Turkish political elite in several occasions. Prime Minister Binali 
Yıldıƌıŵ has stƌessed that TuƌkeǇ is Ŷot "sǁitĐhiŶg" its positioŶ fƌoŵ the Euƌopean Union through 
its cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Energy Club, but is rather 
enhancing its "determining position in the region." Speaking to media members during his visit to 
Russia, he said, "Our remarks on the Shanghai Union are nothing new. We have been doing so 
even when our relations with the EU were normal. The Shanghai Union is not an alternative to the 
EU" ;AǇdoğaŶ, ϮϬϭϲͿ. 
Neǀeƌtheless, TuƌkeǇ͛s possiďle ƌeƋuest foƌ “CO ŵembership could imply as well a differentiated 
model of EU-Turkey relations. TuƌkeǇ͛s geopolitiĐal loĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ Euƌope aŶd Asia puts the 
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ĐouŶtƌǇ oŶ the EuƌasiaŶ ďelt aŶd ƌeŶdeƌs it as a paƌt of the “CO͛s geogƌaphiĐ sĐope. The 
ƋuestioŶiŶg of TuƌkeǇ͛s EuƌopeaŶ staŶĐe and its labeling it as Middle Eastern contribute to a 
Eurasian shift of geographic identity in Turkish perceptions. 
One possible scenario would be that Turkey becomes the ͞WesteƌŶ iŶteƌloĐutoƌ͛ in Eurasian 
integration. In this respect, Turkish Eurasian policy, far from being an alternative to Euro-Atlantic 
alignment, may instead play a useful role also for its Western interlocutors (Frappi, 2013). The 
distancing of current Turkey from the West makes this scenario less realistic. 
Conclusions 
The economic relationship between the two long standing partners – the EU and Turkey – go deep. 
It is actually a strategic partnership that spans more than 60 years. Indeed, the trade relationship 
goes beyond the scope of the Customs Union. However, as things stand, the Customs Union and 
therefore the evolution of the trade relationship between the EU and Turkey remain the backbone 
of dialogue as the accession talks are at an impasse due to the volatile nature of their political 
relationship.  
As indicated above the Customs Union has been greatly beneficial for Turkey over the years. This 
has been the case not only through increased trade due to reduced tariffs but also through 
increased FDI and the positive externalities that come with it. Overall, Turkey enjoyed increased 
productivity and further integration into global value chains. Finally, the importance of the 
governance of the trade relationship is fundamentally important for Turkey as it is the most viable 
option not to be left out of the mega trade deals at the global level. 
This paper evaluated four different scenarios that are plausible for the future of EU-Turkey trade 
relations. Namely, the modernisation of the Customs Union, European Economic Area 
Membership, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. Finally, as Turkey increases its bid to become a regional and global actor, 
an assessment of its potential participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The 
assessments benefit from other empirical studies and considers the political economy of each 
option more heavily.  
The options evaluated under trade relations with the EU are not exhaustive. There are also the 
options of going back to a Free Trade Agreement or to trading under WTO regime. These options 
were deemed irrelevant. There are two reasons. First, implementing these options would mean 
accepting a status quo that will challenge all the gains achieved thus far. Economically this does 
not make sense. Both parties benefited from the Customs Union and stand to benefit more from 
deepening of trade relations in one form or the other. Politically, both parties have stated in 
several occasions, even at the climax of political tensions at the working level, their preference on 
the development trade relations. Second, as discussed earlier the WTO has been weakened 
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following the failure of Doha round. World trade regime is evolving away from the multi-lateral 
regime. Therefore, these two options fall within the realm of possible but not probable outcomes. 
The European Economic Area membership indeed implies a level of integration that goes beyond 
what is offered by the status quo. In effect, it means an EU Membership minus outcome the 
involves harmonisation across many chapters of the accession process that involves the Single 
Market. However, the EEA is a fragile club that works well only because all non-EU countries adopt 
Single Market legislation on a continuous basis while at the same time not being part of the 
deliberations. Introduction of Turkey to such a system would disrupt the smooth running of the 
club. It needs to be remembered that one of the main motivations behind opening talks of 
modernising the Customs Union was enforcement issues. Finally, although deemed a technicality 
by some, EFTA membership is a prerequisite to EEA membership of non-EU members and the EU 
cannot offer Turkey EFTA membership. This would be the right step towards further integration 
and deepening of the trade relationship but politically not feasible. 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement goes beyond what the Custom Union has to 
offer. It covers services and agriculture as well as regulatory coherence. From an economic 
perspective, this would entail a significant change in the way trade is governed between the two 
parties. However, a DCFTA would mean letting go of the Customs Union. This is problematic 
because politically implies acceptance of an outcome short of EU membership for Turkey. 
Regardless of the fact that the membership talks are not progressing, this outcome is not yet 
formally accepted.  There are two reasons for this implication. First, DCTFA is a tool that has been 
utilized for non-EU members. Second, as mentioned in the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s iŵpaĐt assessŵeŶt, the 
Customs Union is perceived as milestone for accession and removal of this agreement would imply 
a non-membership scenario for Turkey. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is yet far from the kind of political and economic 
cooperation that EU achieved. Therefore, it does not make sense to compare the two as 
alternatives to one another. On the other hand, Turkey has been actively pursuing a more 
prominent role regionally and globally. From an international trade perspective, Turkey had some 
success through diversifying its export destinations over the last 15 years. Coupled with this 
success is the dissatisfaction Turkey has been feeling with regards to its Western allies, the EU 
member states in particular. It is in this vein that Turkey started weighing its option with other 
regional cooperation organizations. At the same time, Turkish officials often stress that the SCO is 
not perceived as an alternative to the EU. Finally, if Turkey were to be a member of the SCO, it 
would have a difficult time reconciling the values of the organization with those of the EU which 
Turkey accepted. 
Finally, the modernisation of the Customs Union with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership in sight is deemed to be the most beneficial scenario economically, politically and 
strategically. The modernisation would mean expansion into services. A Customs Union that 
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covers services would mean Turkey liberalising its services, professional services in particular, 
which would serve as a new source of productivity gain for the whole economy. Needless to say, 
this would revitalize the stagnating FDI into Turkey. The gains are also empirically proven for the 
EU. It would resolve enforcement issues as well. Politically, this would keep the membership 
option on the table while at the same time avoiding, at least for the time being, the political 
tension that comes with it and provides an area of mending and progressing the relationship 
between the two partners. Strategically, it prepares TurkeǇ foƌ ͞doĐkiŶg-iŶ͟ to a poteŶtial TTIP 
agreement between the EU and the US in the future. This is crucial for Turkey. Unlike other FTAs 
that the EU signed with third parties, Turkey would have a difficult time negotiating a FTA with the 
US and if un-prepared both in terms of sectors and regulations it would be harmed. For the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey, this would help avoid a major tension point. 
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